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FLORES v. MEESE: 
INS' BLANKET DETENTION 
OF MINORS INVALIDATED 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Flores v. Meese, 1 a sharply divided en banc panel of the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated an Immigration & 
Naturalization Service (INS) policy3 requiring detention of sus-
pected illegal alien children during the pendency of deportation 
hearings. This policy was mandated by the INS unless the child 
had an adult relative or a legal guardian available to assume cus-
tody.3 Minors with a responsible adult, who was neither a par-
ent nor a legal guardian, available to assume custody and to 
ensure the minor's appearance at deportation hearings were 
1. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per Schroeder, 
J.,with whom Nelson, J., Canby, J., and Thompson, J. join; concurring, Tang, J.; 
concurring, Norris, J.; concurring in part and dissenting in part, Rymer, J.; dissent-
ing, Wallace, C.J.,joined by Wigliins, J., Brunetti, J., and Leavy, J.) (petition for cert. 
filed sub nom. Barr v. Flores, 91-905 (Dec. 9, 1991)). 
2. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1356. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1988). This code pI:ovides in 
pertinent part: 
Juveniles shall be released, in order of preference to: (i) A par-
ent; (ii) legal guardian; or (iii) adult relative (brother, sister, 
aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are not presently in INS 
detention ... (4) In unusual and compelling circumstances 
and at the discretion of the district director or chief patrol 
agent, a juvenile may be released to an adult, other than 
those (previously identified), who executes an agreement 
to care for the juvenile's well-being and to ensure the juve-
nile's presence at all future proceedings before the INS or an 
immigration judge.ld. 
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eligible to be released only at the INS' discretion.· The court held 
this blanket detention policy to be unconstitutional. 6 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. FACTS 
Congress delegated the authority to determine deportation 
policies to the Attorney General.s In 1963, the Attorney General 
promulgated regulations providing that aliens who had been 
arrested on suspicion of deportability could be released, pend-
ing a guarantee to appear at future proceedings, if it was 
deemed appropriate by the INS.? Under these regulations an 
alien was entitled, upon request, to have a hearing with an 
immigration judge to determine his eligibility for release.8 
In 1984, the Western Region of the INS approved a separate 
release policy for minors, proclaiming minors would only be 
released to a parent or a legal guardian. 9 The INS asserted the 
limits on release were necessary to both protect the minor's wel-
fare and safety, and to shield the INS from possible legal lia-
bility.lo The new policy permitted the release of suspected 
4. Id. at 1354. 
5. Id. at 1365. 
6. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress was given the 
power to regulate immigration under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 4. In 8 U.S.C. 1103 (a), 
Congress delegated the administrative duties regarding immigration laws to the Attorney 
General, who oversees the work of the INS. Id . 
. The relevant statutory provision addressing the release or deportation of aliens 
is 8 U.S.C. 1252 (a)(l) which provides in pertinent part: 
Pending a determination of deportability ... [an] alien may, 
upon warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and 
taken into custody ... [A]ny such alien ... may, in the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General and pending such final deter-
mination of deportability, [either] (A) be continued in custody; 
or (B) be released under bond ... containing such conditions 
as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (C) be released on 
conditional parole. Id. 
7. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (c)(2) which provides in perti-
nent part: "When serving the warrant of arrest and when determining any applica-
tion pertaining thereto, the authorized officer shall furnish [the alien] with a notice 
of decision ... indicating whether custody will be continued or terminated, specify-
ing any conditions under which release is permitted ... " Id. 
8. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (d) which states in pertinent part: 
"[A]t a time before a deportation order becomes final, upon application by [the alien] 
... an Immigration Judge may ... continue to detain ... or release from custody [the 
alien] ... " Id. 
9. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. 
10. Id. 
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alien children to other competent adults only in unusual and 
extraordinary cases, and at the discretion of a District Director or 
Chief Patrol Agent. ll The INS attributed the regulation to the dra-
matic increase in the number of minor aliens found unaccompa-
nied by either a parent, or an adult relative.12 The INS, though, 
introduced no record of previous harm to released children, nor did 
it reveal an occasion where liability was incurred as a result of 
harm inflicted upon a minor released to an unrelated third party. 13 
Despite the large number of objections generated by the 
Western Region policy,14 the INS nationalized the policy dur-
ing the course of this litigation.16 In implementing the policy, 
the INS acknowledged that the principal factor in determining 
release or detention of adults was whether the person involved 
was likely to appear at future hearings. 16 The INS maintained 
the purpose for the blanket detention policy of minors was not 
related to either an issue of a possible risk of flight by the alien, 
nor to any provision of immigration laws. 17 The INS claimed the 
principal justification for the new detention policy was the safe-
ty of the minors. IS Since the INS did not have the sufficient 
resources nor the expertise needed to complete a comprehen-
sive home study of each proposed custodian, it was reluctant 
11.Id. 
12. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355-1356. See 53 Fed. Reg. 17,449 (May 17, 1988) 
which states in pertinent part: 
Since 1980 the INS has witnessed a dramatic increase in the 
number of juvenile aliens it encounters ... In most cases the 
juvenile is not accompanied by a parent, legal guardian or 
other adult relative. Id. As with adults, the decision of whether 
to detain or release a juvenile depends on the likelihood that 
the alien will appear for all future proceedings. Id. However 
with respect to juveniles a determination must also be made 
as to whose custody the juvenile should be released. Id. On the 
one hand, the concern for the welfare of the juvenile will not 
permit release to just any adult. Id. On the other hand, the 
Service has neither the expertise nor the resources to conduct 
home studies for placement of each juvenile released ... Id. 
13. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355. 
14. Id. Groups objecting to the INS policy included Amnesty International, 
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, International Human Rights Law Group, and 
Defense for Children International. Id. KIt is hard to imagine litigants more sympa-
thetic than Jenny Flores, who was 15 years old in 1985 when she was arrested. She 
had been sent north by her parents in El Salvador only to find that the U.S. author-
ities would not release her to her uncle in Texas: Gail Diane Cox and Joan M. 
Cheever, Children's Crusade; The INS Loses A Pivotal Case On Alien Youths, NAT'L 
L.J., Sept. 2, 1991, at 1. 
15. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1355-1356. 
16. Id. at 1356. See supra note 12. 
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to release any minor to an unrelated third party. 19 The INS 
did not elucidate any justification for its assumption that 
home studies were necessary, nor did it indicate whether 
comprehensive home studies were conducted before promul-
gation of this policy.20 Instead, the INS insisted that the vague-
ness of the regulation was essential since it gave INS officials 
the broadest possible discretion in determining whether deten-
tion was required.21 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiffs filed this action challenging the Western 
Region's policy of detaining suspected alien children.22 The 
plaintiffs represented a class of children who did not pose a risk 
of flight, were not a threat to the community, and had respon-
sible adult third parties available to take temporary custody 
of them. 23 Thus, the only reason given by the INS for the plain-
tiffs' detention was no adult relative, nor legal guardian was 
available to assume the minor's custody.24 
The plaintiffs asserted the INS policy regarding detention 
of minors violated the Immigration & Nationality Act26, their 
Fifth Amendment right of due process,26 and their Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection guarantee.27 The plaintiffs further 
challenged the INS' failure to provide prompt written notice to 
the detainee describing whether bond release conditions had 
been imposed.28Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed they were 
denied a prompt, mandatory, neutral and detached review 
19. Id. at 1356-1357. See supra note 12. 
20. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1356. 
21. Id. See supra note 12. 
22. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1991). 
23. Id. at 1357. 
24.Id. 
25. Id. (citing Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991,995 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended». 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see also Administrative Procedure Act (APA); 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
26. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». U.S. 
CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " Id. 
27. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV §1 provides in pertinent part: 
-... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person oflife,liberty, 
or property, without due process oflaw; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. 
28. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357 (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». 
4
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following arrest. 29 The plaintiffs asserted the review was 
necessary to determine whether probable cause originally 
existed for the arrest, whether the bond condition was neces-
sary to ensure future appearances, and whether any available 
adult was suitable to protect the well-being of the minor, as well 
as to ensure the minor's appearance at future hearings.so 
The District Court declared the INS provisions to be in vio-
lation of the plaintiffs' equal protection rights, and the plain-
tiffs were granted summary judgment.S! The defendants 
appealed to a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.S2 The 
majority of the panel vacated the first paragraph of the District 
Court decision and held the detention policy did not adverse-
ly affect any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights.ss The panel 
decided the INS should be given deferential treatment in 
implementing its policy.s, The panel also remanded the third 
paragraph of the District Court order,S6 and decided the appro-
priate model for evaluating procedural due process should be 
the balancing test described in Mathews v. EldridgeS6, rather 
29. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357. (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». 
30. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357. (citing Flores, 934 F.2d at 995 (as amended». 
31. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1357-1358. The District Court order provided: 
(1). Defendants ... shall release any minor otherwise eligi-
ble for release on bond or recognizance to his parents, 
guardian, custodian, conservator, or other responsible adult 
party. Id. at 1357. Prior to any such release, the defendants 
may require from such persons a written promise to bring 
such minor before the appropriate officer or court when 
requested by the INS. Id .. at 1357-1358. 
(2). Whenever a minor is released as 8roresaid, the minor shall 
be promptly advised in writing in a language he understands 
of any restrictions imposed upon his release. Id. at 1358. 
(3). Any minor taken into custody shall be forthwith afford-
ed an administrative hearing to determine probable cause for 
his arrest and the need for any restrictions placed upon his 
release. Id. Such hearing shall be held with or without a 
request by or on behalf of the minor. Id. 
32. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. . 
33. Id. See supra note 31. 
34. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. 
35. Id. See supra note 31. 
36. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court determined a balanc-
ing test should be used to determine whether a hearing was necessary before an indi-
viduals' disability benefits were terminated. Id. at 332-335. The balancing test 
consisted of three factors: 
The first factor was the strength of the private interest, and how it would be affect-
ed by the outcome. Id. at 335. The second factor was the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of add i-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards. Id. These two provisions were to be bal-
anced against the third factor, the government's interest, which included the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entail. Id. 
5
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than the Gerstein v. Pugh37 requirement of review by a neutral 
and detached magistrate requested by the plaintiff class.3s 
The plaintiffs' motion for an en banc ruling claimed the 
panel decision majority failed to recognize their fundamental 
interest in liberty.89 The Ninth Circuit decided to hear the 
case en banc due to the importance of the issues involved, 
and the impact of the policy affecting the great number of 
children arrested on suspicion of being illegal aliens.40 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS As ALIENS 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the 
issue regarding the rights of aliens, ruling that although the 
plaintiff class may be illegal aliens they were still entitled to 
proof regarding the legality of their detention. 41 The court 
cited a well established principle pronouncing any person pre-
sent in the United States is entitled to equal justice and pro-
cedural due process.42 The court declared that a vital component 
of personal liberty is the ability to test the legality of any 
direct restraint implemented by the government, guaranteed 
37. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, the Supreme Court 
determined that a timely, neutral, detached magistrate was necessary to determine 
if probable cause existed to hold a criminal defendant. Id. at 126. This determination 
was mandatory to any pretrial detention in the criminal context. Id. 
38. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. But see Flores, 934 F.2d at 1014 (as amended). Judge 
Fletcher's dissent described the case as Mamong the most disturbing I have confront-
ed in my years on the court." Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting). ·Children are being held 
in detention by the INS for as long as two years in highly inappropriate conditions out 
of a professed concern for their welfare." Id. Judge Fletcher was further dismayed by 
the process which allowed an INS agent, not a judge, to place children in detention cen-
ters which "deprived (the minors) of education, recreation and visitation" and subjected 
the minors to being Mcommingled with adults of both sexes and subjected to strip search-
es with no showing of cause." Id. Judge Fletcher believed the District Court's order 
was a Msimple, sensible, minimally intrusive direction to the agency." Id. 
39. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1358. 
40. Id. at 1359. 
41. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1991). 
42. Id. at 1359. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). In Plyler, the Court held 
that a state could not deny public education to the children of illegal aliens, without 
showing that such a policy furthered a state interest. Id. See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court held Fourteenth Amendment due process 
provisions to be Muniversal in their application to all persons within the territorial juris-
diction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality; and the equal 
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Id. at 369. 
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through the right to seek a habeas corpus writ.4lI The court pro-
claimed alienage did not prevent a person from testing the 
legality of his confinement." Thus, the court ruled the plain-
tiff class was entitled to proof regarding the legality of their 
detention regardless of their alienage.46 
The Ninth Circuit determined the INS could not detain 
suspected aliens without a specific exercise of discretion, 
such as finding the detained individual would be a menace to 
the community, or would pose a risk offlight.4e In the case at 
bar, the court determined that the INS did not demonstrate 
a specific reason for the plaintiffs' detention.47 Therefore, 
the court held that the plaintiffs' possessed a fundamental 
right, secured by the Constitution, to be free from govern-
mental detention unless a determination was made illus-
trating the reasons why detention furthered a specific 
governmental interest." The court found no such interest in 
the case at bar.49 
43. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. "There is no higher duty than to maintain it [the 
writ of habeas corpus] unimpaired." (quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 
(1939». 
44. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. See Wing Wong v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
In Wing Wong, the Court recognized the Congressional power to expel aliens, but held 
a judicial trial was a predicate to such action. Id. "To declare unlawful residence with-
in the country to be an infamous crime, punishable by deprivation ofliberty and prop-
erty, would be to pass out of the sphere of constitutional legislation, unless provision 
were made that the fact of guilt should first be established by a judicial trial." Id. at 
237. 
45. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 
(1892). In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court held that aliens were entitled to habeas corpus 
writs. Id. "An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming 
authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is 
doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is law-
ful."Id. at 660. 
46. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359-1360. See Carlson v. Landon 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
Carlson involved a plaintiff class who was detained on suspicion of being members of 
the Communist Party under the Internal Security Act of 1950. Id. at 528. The plain-
tiffs requested habeas corpus review, challenging their pre-deportation detention on 
the ground that it was not proven that they were either a risk to the community, nor 
presented a risk of flight. Id. at 529-530. The Supreme Court held that since plaintiffs 
were members of the Communist Party, the INS was allowed to detain the plaintiffs. 
Id. at 541-542. The Court reasoned that the doctrines and practices of Communism 
clearly teach the use of force to achieve political control, thus making the plaintiffs 
a menace to the public. Id. 
47. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1359-1360. 
48. Id. at 1360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 states: "The privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.· Id. 
49. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1360. 
7
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B. PLAINTIFFS' INTERESTS As CHILDREN 
The Ninth Circuit then considered the rights of minors. The 
INS contended that since the plaintiffs were minors, their 
liberty interests were materially different from the adult 
detention standard, thus making the INS detention policy 
reasonable and appropriate. 50 The court, instead ruled the 
Constitution protected the rights of children with due pro-
cess of law in conjunction with any deprivation of liberty. 51 The 
court hypothesized that a minor accused of a criminal offense 
may be subject to pretrial detention based on a determination 
regarding the safety of the child, but this type of detention deci-
sion must be made before a neutral and detached party with 
clearly defined justifications for detention.52 The court rea-
soned that a minor's freedom from institutional confinement 
should be the general rule, and any deviation should be sup-
ported by a specific governmental interest.53 
The Ninth Circuit articulated that governmental detention 
of children should be used only as a last resort, even when the 
governmental purpose is legitimate. 54 The court stressed a 
practical need to avoid institutional detention where less 
restrictive means were available.55 It also maintained indi-
vidual states, not the federal government, were primarily 
responsible for child welfare issues, and state courts have 
held institutional confinement should be used only when 
another type of placement is impossible.56 Finally, the court 
asserted that Congressional policy disfavors the institution-
alization of juveniles. 57 Based on these findings, the court pro-
claimed the age of the plaintiff class should not be used as a 
reason for incarceration, and decided the INS erred in its 
50. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1361 (9th Cir. 1991). 
51. Id. at 1361. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
The Supreme Court held the Constitution demands that minors are entitled to the same 
due process rights as adults during judicial stages of a trial. Id. 




56. 1d. See e.g. R.P. v. State, 718 P.2d 168 (Alaska App. 1986). (states must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that less restrictive alternatives are not possible). 
1d. In re John H., 48 A.D.2d 879 (1975) (other options must first be fully explored). 
Id. 
57. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1361. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
5035 (regarding pre- disposition detention). See also 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (regarding deten-
tion after disposition). 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/15
1992] IMMIGRATION LAW 191 
contention that the plaintiffs had no fundamental liberty 
interest at stake.58 
The Ninth Circuit also contended the INS incorrectly stat-
ed the plaintiffs had the burden of finding an express recog-
nition of a substantive due process right either in the 
Constitution or in a law interpreting the Constitution in order 
to prevail. 59 The court proclaimed that release from detention 
was the minor's remedy for the INS' constitutional violation, 
not a due process right.60 
C. GOVERNMENT PURPOSES INVOLVED 
The Ninth Circuit recognized the unprecedented nature of 
this case, as it involved the detention of people who had not 
been convicted of any crime, did not pose a risk of flight, and 
did not pose any threat of harm to either themselves or to the 
community.61 
The INS based their detention policy on two assertions: (1) 
the child's interests would be better served by INS detention 
than by release to an unrelated responsible adult since the INS 
did not have the means to investigate the living environment 
of the prospective custodian;62 and (2) the policy of detention 
was necessary to protect the INS from criminal and tort liability 
if some injury would occur to the child after being released.63 
The court found no legal basis articulated by the INS to val-
idate its detention policy.64 The In re Gault66 decision invalidated 
the assumption that the children would be better served by 
detention than by release. 66 The court also refuted INS 
58. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362. 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
61. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1362 (9th Cir. 1991). Cf. United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). In SalerTUJ, the detained party had suspected ties to orga-
nized crime, thus posing a risk of flight as well as a potential danger to the commu-
nity if released by the court. Id. Cf. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In 
Carlson, the detained party was an accused member of the Communist Party thus (in 
1950 mentality) posing a threat of harm to the community. Id. 
62. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362. 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This case declares that children should be treat-
ed in a manner least restrictive of their liberty. Id. 
66. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362-1363. 
9
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assertions claiming it should be given deferrence for policy deci-
sions.87 The court determined the INS should be given defer-
ential treatment when its special experience and expertise 
are used, but since the INS is not an expert on child welfare, 
such deference is not proper.68 Additionally, the court found the 
INS' detention policy to be contrary to Congressional deter-
minations which disfavored institutional confinement ofjuve-
niles.89 The court concluded the INS could not unilaterally 
determine that blanket detention somehow served the best 
interests of the plaintiffs, especially in the absence of affir-
mative evidence that release would place the child in danger 
of some harm.70 
The majority decision permitted the INS to make individu-
alized decisions determining whether suspected minor aliens 
should be detained,11 ruling that due process required a specific 
exercise of discretion in conjunction with the decision to detain 
aliens.72 The court also allowed the INS to judge whether the 
minor's proposed guardian would ensure the child's attendance 
at future proceedings.73 Finally, the INS was permitted to deter-
mine in each individual instance whether the minor's release 
would pose harm to either the minor or to the community.74 The 
INS' blanket refusal to make individualized determinations in the 
name of administrative expediency, however, was not allowed 
by the court.76 
The court also disputed the INS' contention that a minor's 
release to an unrelated adult could subject the agency to 
potential tort or criminal liability, without a home-study anal-
ysis of the guardian.76 The Supreme Court ruled that a state 
agency with more expertise in child welfare than the INS, 
67. [d. at 1362. 
68. [d. The court felt deference should be given to the INS in immigration disputes, 
since the INS had special expertise in the field. [d. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 U.S. 88 (1976). In Hampton, the court declared it would not defer to agency deter-
mination in areas outside of the agency's expertise. [d. at 114-115. 
69. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1362. See 18 U.S.C. § 5035 (juvenile detention prior to dis-
position). See also 18 U.S.C. § 5039 (juvenile commitment). 




74. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363. 
75. [d. See e.g. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Reed Court declared 
"administrative convenience does not justify a policy that otherwise runs afoul of the 
Constitution." [d. at 76-77. 
76. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363. 
10
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was not liable for allowing a child to remain in the custody of 
an adult despite evidence the child's safety was in jeop-
ardy.77The court reasoned that by continuing to detain the 
plaintiffs, the INS could face greater exposure to liability by 
establishing a special custodial relationship with the chil-
dren. 78 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the first 
paragraph of the District Court's order relating to minor alien 
release policies.79 The court concluded the District Court's 
order provided the INS with the discretion to make individu-
al decisions on child custody, while disallowing the previous 
blanket detention policy.80 
D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
The plaintiff class argued for the application of the Gerstein 
criminal procedural due process model in this case.8! The 
defendants countered by contending that the Mathews civil pro-
cedural due process model should be applied.82 The court 
sidestepped this controversy by holding the plaintiff class' 
interest in freedom from detention required that the decision 
to detain be made only in conjunction with a neutral and 
detached determination ofnecessity.83 The court affirmed part 
three of the District Court order, regardless of what procedu-
ral due process model was applied.84 The court ordered the INS 
to conduct a detention hearing for suspected alien children 
regardless of whether or not one was requested by the alien.86 
77. [d. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 
(1989). The Court concluded that the actions of a private citizen could not formulate 
a basis ofliability for defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [d. The fact that the child was 
previously in state custody did not matter, as the state is not responsible for a person's 
welfare simply because it previously held the person in custody. [d. at 201. 
78. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1363. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In 
Youngberg, the Court reasoned that a state may acquire a constitutional duty to ensure 
an individual's care by detaining the person in state custody. [d. at 316-317. See also 
Lashawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991). In Dixon, the court held a 
state agency could be possibly liable for a constitutional tort where it fails to provide 
adequate safety for children in its custody. [d. at 996. 
79. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364. See supra note 31. 
80. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364. 
81. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1364 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra note 37. 
82. Flores, 942 F.2d 1352,1365. See supra note 36. 
83. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364. 
84. [d. See supra note 31. 
85. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1364. 
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This hearing must include an inquiry into whether any non- rel-
ative who offers to take custody of the child represents any dan-
ger to the child's well-being. s6 The court articulated that 
mandatory hearings were necessary since children may not be 
capable of understanding their rights. S? Finally, the court 
determined that the hearing requirement was reasonable in 
light of the private interest at stake.SS 
The Ninth Circuit vacated the majority panel decision, 
and affirmed the district court order in all respects.89 
E. DISSENTING OPINION 
The dissent agreed with the majority's assertion that plain-




89. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1365. See supra note 31. 
Tang, J., concurrence. This opinion agreed with the majority, but stressed the 
plaintiffs' fundamental right to freedom from governmental detention existing in the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as in the Constitutional guarantee of 
habeas corpus. ld. at 1365. This concurrence stressed the idea that physical freedom 
from governmental detention was a fundamental right guaranteed by the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment.ld. Judge Tang believed the Mathews balancing model 
of procedural due process should be used since the proceedings were civil. ld. at 
1367. The Mathews test, if applied to this case, favors the plaintiffs' interests over the 
INS'. ld. at 1367-1369. Additionally, this opinion believed the due process clause 
required the INS to promptly give detained minors an impartial and detached review 
of their detention.ld. Judge Tang also emphasized the constitutionality of both the 
initial decision to detain, and the conditions imposed upon release after the initial 
detention.ld. at 1369-1370. 
Norris, J. concurrence. This opinion emphasized the flagrant due process viola-
tions by the INS' policy of incarcerating children. ld. at 1370. Judge Norris empha-
sized that the governmental interests in detention were trivial, and were greatly 
outweighed by the liberty issue at stake for the plaintiff class.ld. at 1370-1372. 
Rymer, J. partial concurrence and partial dissent. Judge Rymer sought a 
constitutionally appropriate balance between the plaintiffs' interests in freedom and 
the government's responsibility for the safety of the plaintiffs. ld. at 1372. This 
opinion disagreed with the majority's holding that the Constitution requires a minor's 
release to any responsible adult who would promise to bring the child back for future 
hearings. ld. Judge Rymer sought a narrower holding, yet she would have affirmed 
the District Court's summary judgment for the plaintiffs due to the lack of procedural 
due process in the INS regulations. ld. This opinion, however, objected to the majority 
holding regarding the revision of the release requirement to a responsible adult 
party.ld. Judge Rymer believed 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (b)(4), as written, gave the INS the 
needed flexibility and afforded greater protection to the plaintiff class, and did not have 
to be rewritten.ld. at 1373-1376. Thus, this opinion concurred with the majority that 
the process used by the INS in determining release was not constitutionally sufficient, 
but Judge Rymer was reluctant to remove the INS hearing officer's discretion. ld. at 
1376-1377. 
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challenge their detention.90 The dissent, though, found much 
of the majority's discussion irrelevant to what it deemed the 
central issues in the case at bar.9t 
The dissent objected to the majority's conclusion on the 
plaintiffs' liberty right at issue. 92 It perceived the need to 
define the liberty right in a much more narrow fashion.93 The 
dissent disputed the majority's characterization of the INS' 
detention policy as "blanket detention".94 Alien children were 
eligible for release to a number of potential parties, thus the 
dissent claimed, the only right the plaintiffs were being denied 
was the right to be released to unrelated adults without INS 
approva1.95 The dissent found no precedent in which a court had 
ever recognized a fundamental substantive due process right 
to a physical liberty. 96 The INS's desire to protect the plaintiffs, 
as well as its practical concern to avoid potential liability, 
vitiated any substantive due process violation because of the 
legitimate ends to which the regulation was rationally relat-
ed.97 Therefore, the dissent postulated that minimal scrutiny 
should be applied to the INS regulation since no fundamental 
right was involved.9s 
The dissent was troubled by the special circumstances of the 
case at bar, claiming two factors should influence the consti-
tutional analysis of the INS regulation." First, the court should 
focus on the immigration aspect ofthe case, due to the unique 
nature of immigration laws. tOO The dissent also claimed the 
power over immigration was political, thereby existing in the 
legislative and executive branches. tOt Since the judiciary had 
90. Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1377 (9th. Cir 1991) (Wallace, C.J., dis-
senting). 




95. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1377. 
96. [d. at 1378. "The text of the Due Process Clause does not protect individu-
als against deprivations of liberty simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations 
of liberty 'without due process oflaw .... [d. (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't 
of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, 2859 (1990) (Scalia, J. concurring». 
97. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1379-1380. 
98. [d. at 1380. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. 
101. [d. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). In Fiallo, the Court stressed that 
in no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it 
is over the admission of aliens. [d. at 792. See also Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th 
Cir. 1984) "[T]he courts have repeatedly emphasized that the responsibility for reg-
ulating the admission of aliens resides in the first instance with Congress. ~ [d. at 965. 
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a limited role in immigration, strict scrutiny review should not 
apply to an immigration regulation. loa The dissenting opinion 
argued the courts should give deference to the INS and only 
apply limited judicial review to evaluate the regulation. lOB 
Additionally, the dissent maintained that the age of the 
plaintiffs should be factored into the court's analysis. lo, 
Therefore the INS' regulation was an exercise of governmen-
tal power which took into account the need to provide for the 
plaintiffs in the absence of parental control. l06 
The dissent objected to the majority's conclusion regarding 
potential tort liability for the INS should a released minor 
become injured. lOG The dissent believed the majority opinion 
would make the INS liable to civil claims should a child become 
injured while on release to an unrelated adult.lO? 
Finally, the dissent stated the case should be remanded for 
a determination of the constitutionally required procedures 
under the Mathews model of procedural due process, owing to 
the potentially sweeping nature of the District Court's order. lOB 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Flores v. Meese 
struck down an INS policy of detaining minors suspected of 
being illegal aliens when neither a parent nor a legal guardian 
was available to assume custody of the child. The court required 
the INS to release minor aliens awaiting deportation hearings, 
102. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1380. 
103. Id. at 1381-1382. 
104. Id. at 1383. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Schall held that a state 
may restrict a child's liberty interest to protect the child's welfare. Id. Children were 
not presumed to have the capacity to care for themselves, rather they were assumed 
to be under parental control, and if parental control faltered, the state had to act as 
parents in their place. Id. at 265. 
105. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1383. 
106. Id. at 1382. 
107. Id. The dissent postulated that the majority misinterpreted DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The dissent felt 
DeShaney had no bearing on the possibility that the INS will be held liable for releas-
ing alien minors to unrelated adults. The DeShaney Court was careful to emphasize 
that the plaintiff could not recover from the state because the state did not create the 
danger, and was not liable for not giving aid.Id. at 196-197. The DeShaney Court dis-
tinguished that case from one where the state created the danger. Id. Thus, the dis-
sent felt the DeShaney decision could not forecast the possibility oflNS liability for 
the il\iuries of minors released to unrelated third parties.Id. 
108. Flores, 942 F.2d at 1384-1385. 
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who were otherwise eligible for bond release to their parents 
or legal guardians, to responsible unrelated adult parties. 
The Ninth Circuit also established mandatory hearings for 
detained minors before an immigration judge for determination 
of the terms and conditions of release. The court permitted the 
INS to require a written guarantee from the proposed custodian 
promising the child's appearance at deportation hearings. The 
court allowed the INS to make detention decisions on a case by 
case basis to protect the safety of both the minor and the pub-
lic. The INS' blanket detention policy of minors who did not 
have an available parent nor legal guardian available to accept 
custody was ruled unconstitutional. The liberty rights of the 
aliens outweighed the governmental interest when detention 
served no legitimate governmental purpose. 
Richard A. Karoly' 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993. 
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